How Spurs Won: Home vs West Ham
By Ryan Wrenn
Spurs’ superb 4-1 win over London rivals West Ham at White Hart Lane Sunday was a study in contrasts; not only between the two teams, but also between the Tottenham team of the past and the Tottenham team of the present.
In the last three matches against West Ham in all competitions played at White Hart Lane, Spurs had been outscored by a combined goal tally of seven to three and earned a single point from the nine available. Sam Allardyce’s West Ham knew how to play against those Spurs teams, knew their weaknesses, knew their tendency to defeat themselves as often as they defeated the opposition. He fielded teams built to exploit what he knew, and it paid off outrageously.
Allardyce was fired by West Ham’s board over the summer. Slaven Bilić came in to fill the void, and few could be disappointed from his performance so far. With 21 points after 12 games, this was a better start to a Premier League season than West Ham had ever managed before. They sat sixth in the table, only behind Spurs on goal difference. Wins away from home against the likes of Arsenal, Liverpool and Manchester City were proof enough of their prowess on the road. They know how to defend deep and counter when the opportunity arose. It was the type of team that had so often troubled Spurs in the past.
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All of which is to say that the team that arrived in north London Sunday afternoon was especially confident of some manner of result, even if they were lacking their talismanic creator, Dimitri Payet. They’d won before against Tottenham without the Frenchman, and they could do it again.
So what happened? How did West Ham manage to lose their first game at White Hart Lane since 2012?
The answer is best illustrated by two contrasting sets of numbers, provided with the help of WhoScored.
West Ham managed ten total shots over the course of the 90 minutes, four of which were on target. Sixty percent of those total shots came from outside of Tottenham’s penalty area.
Tottenham managed 22 total shots over the course of 90 minutes, twelve of which were on target. Sixty-four percent of those total shots came from inside of West Ham’s penalty area.
Those two pieces of data – shot totals and shot locations – are in some way interrelated of course. In theory, the closer you get to goal, the more likely you are to shoot, and the more likely you are to be able to make sure that shot is at least on target. Tottenham’s ability to penetrate West Ham’s backline and get closer to goal created more valuable opportunities: nine of the twelve shots on target – including three of the goals – came from within the 18 yard box.
How were Spurs able to be so penetrative? Put simply: by being narrow, and focusing their areas on West Ham’s weakest point. The efforts of Christian Eriksen on the left of attacking midfield, Dele Alli in the center and Harry Kane up come tended to combine right inside or around the D at the top of West Ham’s box. It is from that general area that all three of Tottenham’s goals in open play were created.
West Ham were weakest at that point because of Tottenham’s attacking four was frequently stretching the defense, specifically pulling James Tomkins to the right as the centre-back sought to close down Christian Eriksen and his link up with the Spurs players helping him overload that left flank. Typically Tomkins’ movements would be covered by a defensive midfielder dropping back, but Mark Noble and Cheikhou Kouyaté were often caught upfield as Tottenham rapidly transitioned back into attack after reclaiming the ball and found the area behind that midfield pair frequently open.
West Ham’s inability to find a similar kind of advantage as Spurs did speaks to how much Mauricio Pochettino has drilled this squad to actively avoid those same mistakes. Eric Dier is frequently the best example of this improvement. Even when Spurs are in possession, Dier is very rarely forward. He sits back and waits for Tottenham to loose possession, then closes down those avenues that he opposition has to enter the penalty area behind him from the front door.
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On Sunday, this meant keeping Manuel Lanzini from being able to do all that much. The Argentine was due to take over creative duties from the injured Payet, though rarely got a chance to do so in front of Spurs’ goal. In fact he only managed to receive a mere three passes within ten yards of the center of Spurs’ penalty area, and received none within that area. He was limited to making short, lateral passes, usually around the center circle. Even if Lanzini did score West Ham’s only goal, the move that allowed that to happen – an uncharacteristic error by Kyle Walker – was more the exception than the rule.
Andy Carroll in front of him consequently didn’t fair much better, only getting any kind of contact with the ball as the result of long balls from deep. Victor Moses and Diafra Sakho were kept limited to the flanks and rarely found any joy by cutting inside. That overall defensive shell – created in large part by Dier’s efforts, but also of course naturally stemming from Jan Vertonghen and Toby Alderweireld’s superb coordination between themselves and the full-backs – keeps West Ham desperately shooting from distance instead of finding a way into the box. As simple a concept as it might seem, that shell was decidedly not a component of Spurs teams in the recent past. Now, under Pochettino’s direction, it has become the centerpiece of how Tottenham win games.